Firstly, state cyber attack capability is clearly deployable - witness the number of major cyber attacks with suspected state involvement. From early 21st Century attacks on a variety of US systems (with suspected Chinese involvement), through attacks on Estonia and Georgia (when at loggerheads with their superpower neighbour), to the suspected retaliatory targeting of Sony following an unflattering depiction of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, the role of the state looms large. Carefully crafted cyber attacks 'work'.
Secondly, attack attribution is fraught. Much public attribution is based on code analysis and is circumstantial and spoof-able. Furthermore, assertions of attribution, whether correct or not, are seen as political statements from far from disinterested stakeholders; there is generally an element of 'They would say that, wouldn't they?'. Even when conclusive evidence of attribution exists it may not be possible to release it. Plausible deniability is often achievable. Some states may wish to claim responsibility for cyber attacks, others may wish to deny all involvement, others will deny any involvement but privately welcome that they are deemed (probably correctly) to be advanced enough to launch sophisticated attacks, whilst others may wish to attack and implicate other states. An attack by a nation state and an attack by individuals or groups seemingly acting with goals that would meet with state approval might be difficult to distinguish, a convenience for some states. Also, attacks do not need to be launched from within the physical boundaries of the responsible nation state. Analysis for attribution may also need to go back several years. Determining the ultimate 'source' poses significant challenges.
Thirdly, advanced economies are hugely dependent on IT and the fabric of our society is set to become more computer-centric with the rise of, for example, the Internet of Things, smart homes, smart cities, smart vehicles and transport infrastructure, and manufacturing automation. There are juicy targets galore and the set is expanding. Disabling a health service's IT or an intelligent transport system by cyber means is ultimately a far easier and more attractive proposition than lobbing a nuke. Plausible deniability is much better, of course.
Finally, cyber attack is cost-effective beyond belief. The economics are monumentally non-linear: it may take a single researcher only a few hours to discover a flaw with the technical force of a digital nuke. The destruction per dollar may be enormous. Similarly, where intellectual property or other confidential information is concerned, whether the domain be diplomatic, military, or commercial, the advantages of cyber theft over toil are clear.
The economics of cyber-weaponry raises uncomfortable issues for advanced nation states. They can and do maintain a general technological lead in cyber matters and are able to fund significant tooling up for the tasks ahead. But the economics of cyber attack means that the bar to entry is not prohibitive. A small but highly talented team can wreak enormous damage and be a major offensive asset. You simply don't need a Manhattan Project. Cyber warfare may be the ultimate expression of the power of ideas and intellectual talent and the most advanced economies of the world do not have a monopoly on that.
Overall the rationale for maintaining a direct engagement capability seems overwhelming, whether states admit to it or not. We will doubtless see many more states build up significant capability and there remains the possibility of various pseudo-states doing so. Interesting times lie ahead.
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